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Is Loitering a Fundamental Right?
City of Chicago v. Morales
INTRODUCTION
"The constitution does not protect the right to stand next to a gang
member. ",,
"A thousand miles and a world away, the Supreme Court"
affirmed "the state court ruling striking down Chicago's anti-loitering
ordinance as unconstitutional." 2 In City of Chicago v. Morales, the
Supreme Court held that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague
in that it failed to provide fair notice of the prohibited conduct and
was impermissibly vague in establishing minimal guidelines for
enforcement.3 The Supreme Court failed to recognize the terror that
gangs cause citizens of the city everyday. The Court also failed to
recognize that existing law enforcement procedures were ineffective;
a new and innovative method of community policing was necessary to
rid the Chicago streets of the evil caused by gangs.
This Comment explores the opinion in City of Chicago v.
Morales. Part I looks at the reasons behind the enactment of the
Ordinance drafted by the Chicago City Council. Part II states the
history of the case. Part III focuses on the Substantive Due Process of
the Fourteenth Amendment as it applies to the Ordinance. Part IV
discusses the balancing of rights and part V concentrates on the void-
for-vagueness doctrine. Finally, the conclusion states that the
Ordinance should not have been deemed unconstitutional.
1 Linda Greenhouse, Before the High Court, Chicago Defends Approach to
Gangs, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 10, 1998, at A29 (quoting Lawrence Rosenthal, Chicago's
deputy corporation counsel).
2 See Terry Moran, Beyond the Law and the Lens Lies a Cityscape of Quiet
Desperation, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 4, 1999, at 21.
3 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999).
41d.
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I. DRAFTING OF THE ORDINANCE
When I walk out my door, these guys are out there....
They watch you .... They know where you live. They
know what time you leave, what time you come home.
I am afraid of them. I have even come to the point
now that I carry a meat cleaver to work with me ...I
don't want to hurt anyone, and don 't want to be hurt.
We need to clean these corners up. Clean these
communities up and take it back from them.5
Gangs have had incredible growth in the recent years. "From
1980 to 1995, the number of cities reporting street gang problems
grew nearly sevenfold.",6  "[T]he number of gangs reported grew
eleven and a half times . . .; and the number of gang members
increased six and a half times . . . "7 "In 1995 students age twelve to
nineteen were nearly twice as likely to report street gangs in their
schools than in 1989. ''8 "Central city students were even more likely
to respond that there were street gangs at their schools." 9  Gang
violence has also, changed dramatically from "small scale
confrontation" to "gangbangs" and "drive-by shootings." 10  From
1984 to 1993, juveniles committing homicides drastically increased
5 Id. at 1880 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Transcript of Proceedings
before the City Council of Chicago, Committee on Police and Fire 66-67 (May 15,
1997)[hereinafter Transcript]).
6 Brief of the Center for the Community Interest as Amicus Curiae in Support
of Petitioner at 8, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121). In
1995, the number of cities reporting gangs grew to approximately 2,000 jurisdictions. Id.
7 Id. at 8. In 1995 there were more than 23,000 gangs reported with more
than 650,000 gang members. Id.
8 Id. In 1989 15.3% of students reported street gangs in their schools as
opposed to 28.4% in 1995. id.
9 Id. In 1995 central city students reported street gang violence in their
schools was 40.7% compared to 19.9% for suburban or non-metropolitan area students.
Id.
10 HERBERT C. COVEY, ET AL., JUVENILE GANGS 34 (2d ed. 1997).
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one hundred sixty-nine percent. 1' In 1994 alone, Chicago and Los
Angeles reported over one thousand gang homicides.12
Today, more than ever, gangs have access to firearms such as
automatic and semi-automatic weapons.' 3 The increase in the number
of deaths is attributed to the "more powerful weapons."' 4 Not only do
the gangs use gunfire, but they also have access to and often use
bombs such as Molotov Cocktails. 15
"A 1995 Justice Department Survey of twenty percent of the
nation's law enforcement agencies reported an estimated 23,388 gangs
with nearly 665,000 members."' 16 Chicago ranked third among the top
ten cities with the most gang members.' 7  About one hundred
thousand gang members have been identified by the Chicago Police
Department's gang investigation section. 18 The Department believes
that nearly one hundred twenty gangs exist in the City of Chicago.' 9
It is apparent that Chicago has been plagued with gang
violence, intimidation, and crime. 20  Ordinary citizens are afraid for
their lives and the lives of their children.2' Children and innocent
bystanders are caught in the crossfire of rival gangs on a daily basis.22
People are afraid to leave their homes. 23 Some who have the means
11 See ILLINOIS CRIMINAL JUSTICE AUTHORITY, RESEARCH BULLETIN, STREET
GANGS AND CRIME 16-17 (1996).
12 Brief of the Center for the Community Interest, supra note 6, at 9 and
footnote 11.
13 id.
14 Id (explaining that there was a dramatic increase in deaths between 1990
and 1994).
15 See Brief of the Center for the Community Interest, supra note 6, at 10.
16 John Gibeaut, Gang Busters, A.B.A. J., Jan. 1998, at 66.
17 See Brief of the Center for the Community Interest, supra note 6, at 9 and
footnote 11; see also Gibeaut, supra note 16.
18 See Gibeaut, supra note 16, at 67 (statement by Harvey Radney,
Commander of the Chicago Police Department Gang Investigation).
19 Id
20 See Don Terry, Chicago Housing Project Basks in a Tense Peace, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 1992, at A10.
21 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organization in
Support of the Petitioner at 19-21, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)
(No. 97-1121).
22 Id. at 19. Gangs have gone from small-scaled localized activity to large-
scale highly organized activity. Id.
23 Id. at 20.
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move to the suburbs or to gated communities, where gang presence is
minimal.24 However, most people just lock themselves in their
homes. 25 Gang members use the streets to intimidate residents, recruit
young children, and conduct business. 26 Gang members hang out on
27 2every street comer, protecting their turf from other gangs.28
The people in the community know who belongs to a gang
and who does not.29 The gang members openly display their gang
membership by wearing their gang colors, having tattoos of their gang
symbols, or simply admit that they belong to a particular gang.3" The
police can also identify who gang members are by the same methods
and by having reliable informants.31 However, the police simply did
not have the means to deal with street gang problems. The gang
members are smart. They know how to pretend - to act like nothing
is going on.32 They know when to hide the drugs they are selling,
cease harassment of the neighborhood kids, and stop intimidation of
the neighborhood residents.33 When police officers go by, they find
no illegal activity; and therefore have no reason to arrest gang
members who are loitering on the streets. Unfortunately, the police
officers have to keep driving past the gang members.
How then can we combat gang violence if the conventional
methods of dealing with the problem have not worked? How can
24 See Brief of the Center for the Community Interest, supra note 6, at 5
(stating that criminal street gangs have become more pervasive and have committed more
violent crimes than ever before).
25 Id. (explaining that gangs constantly intimidate law-abiding residents).
26 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organization in
Support of the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 19-20. When social disorder exists, citizens
become more and more fearful causing them to retreat into their homes. Id.27 1d. at 19.
28 See Brief of the Center for the Community Interest, supra note 6, at 6.
Since law-abiding residents retreat into their homes, the streets are left open for the gangs
and their violence. Id.
29 See Brief by the Los Angeles County District Attorney on Behalf of Los
Angeles County at 8-10, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-
1121).
30 Id. at 8-9. Advertisement of gang membership is used for intimidation
involved in controlling a neighborhood and for maintaining gang membership. Id.
31 Id. at 8-10.
32 See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (preamble to the Ordinance).
33 id.
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community members feel safe again? The only solution is for the
community to come together.34 Gangs tend to flourish when people in
the neighborhoods leave the communities or are afraid to leave their
homes.35 When a neighborhood is weak, the gangs become strong.36
However, when the social fabric of the community is strong, the
gangs can be controlled.37
Just like other cities that have been plagued with gang
violence, Chicago has been struggling to create some sense of order
within its communities. In response to the terror the gangs have
caused law-abiding citizens, the Chicago City Council held a two-day
hearing on May 15 and 18, 1992 before the Committee on Police and
Fire.38  Many community members came to share their horrifying
stories with the Committee. 39 Residents testified that gang members
loitered on the streets all hours of the day and night. 40  Community
members testified to the intimidation they experienced, such as, drive-
by shootings, drug trafficking, solicitation of young children to join
gangs, and disruption of local business. 41  Residents were simply
afraid and wanted to find a way to control the gangs.42
The City Council decided to take the initiative and
subsequently found an innovative way to deal with the problem. It
drafted the City Municipal Code § 8-4-015, widely known as
34 See G. David Curry, Gang-Related Violence, in CLEARINGHOUSE REV.,
Special Issue 1994 at 450 (Vol. 28, No. 4, 1994) (stating that gang relatdd problems are
essentially community level problems requiring community level solutions).
35 Id. at 451 ("Gangs grow and flourish between the social spaces of other
institutions such as" family, school, and church).
31 Id. at 450.
3 7 id.
38 See Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, at 4, City of Chicago v.
Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121). The Washington Legal Foundation is a
non-profit public interest law and policy center which devotes substantial portion of its
resources to criminal justice reform and crime prevention efforts. Id.
39 Id. Citizens testified that the quality of life in their neighborhoods had
deteriorated significantly as a result of increased street gang activity. Id.
40 Id. at 4-5 (stating that at any given night 30-40 gang members hang out at
the intersection blocking traffic, throwing gang signs, intimidating residents and, in
general, disrupting life in the entire community).
4 1 Id. at4.
421 d. at 4-5.
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Chicago's gang anti-loitering ordinance.43 This Ordinance allowed
the police to issue dispersal orders to people who loitered on the
43 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015. The Ordinance reads as follows:
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across
the nation, has been experiencing an increase murder rate as
well as an increase in violent and drug related crimes; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that the
continuing increase in criminal street gang activity in the
City is largely responsible for this unacceptable situation;
and
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City,
the burgeoning presence of street gang members in public
places has intimidated many law abiding citizens; and
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which street gangs
establish control over identifiable areas is by loitering in
those areas and intimidating others from entering those
areas; and
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest
by committing no offense punishable under existing law
when they know the police are present, while maintaining
control over identifiable areas by continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering
in public places by criminal street gang members creates a
justifiable fear for the safety of persons and property in the
area because of the violence, drug dealing and vandalism
often associated with such activity; and
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in discouraging
all persons from loitering in public places with criminal
street gang members; and
WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the
city's streets and other public places without fear
The Ordinance provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he
reasonably believes to be a criminal gang member loitering
in any public place with one or more other persons, he shall
order all such persons to disperse and remove themselves
from the area. Any person who does not promptly obey
such an order is in violation of this section.
It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of
this section that no person who was observed loitering was
in fact a member of a criminal street gang.
As used in this section:
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"Loiter" means to remain in one place with no apparent
purpose.
"Criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization,
association in fact or group of three or more persons,
whether formal or informal, having as one of its substantial
activities the commission of one or more of the criminal
acts enumerated in paragraph (3), and whose members,
individually or collectively, engage in a pattern of criminal
gang activity.
"Criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted
commission, or solicitation of the following offenses,
provided that the offenses are committed by two or more
persons, or by an individual at the discretion of, or in
association with, any criminal street gang, with the specific
intent to promote, further, or assist in any criminal conduct
by gang members:
The following sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 9-1
(murder), 9-3.3 (drug-induced homicide), 10-1
(kidnapping), 10-4 (aggravated assault-discharging
firearm), 12-4 (aggravated battery with firearm), 12-4.1
(heinous battery), 12-4.2 (aggravated battery with firearm),
12-4.3 (aggravated battery of a child), 12-4.6 (aggravated
battery of a senior citizen), 12-6.1 (compelling organization
membership of a person, 12-11 (home invasion), 12-14
(aggravated criminal sexual assault), 18-1 (robbery), 18-2
(armed robbery), 19-1 (burglary), 19-3 ( residential
burglary), 19-5 (criminal fortification of a residence or
building), 20-1 (arson), 20-1.1 (aggravated arson), 20-2
(possession of explosives or explosive incendiary devices),
subsection (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(9), or (a)(12) of section 24-1
(unlawful use of weapons), 24-1.1 (unlawful use or
possession of weapons by felons or persons in the custody
of Department of Corrections facilities), 24-1.2 (aggravated
discharge of a firearm), subsection (d) of section 25-1 (mob
action-violence), 33-1( bribery), 33A-2 (armed violence);
Sections 5, 5.1, 7 or 9 of the Cannabis Control Act where
the offense is a felony (manufacturing or delivery of
cannabis, cannabis trafficking, calculated criminal cannabis
conspiracy and related offenses); or section 401, 401.1, 405,
407 or 407.1 of the Illinois Controlled Substances Act
(illegal manufacture or delivery of a controlled substance,
controlled substance trafficking, calculated criminal drug
conspiracy and related offenses).
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streets. There are several reasons why the City Council gave police
the power to issue dispersal orders.44 These reasons include the city's
increased murder rate, other drug and violent crime rates, the
residents' fear, the control gangs have over the city via loitering, the
inability of police to control gang presence and criminal activity, and
"threats to persons and property" from loitering gang members.
The Council designed this ordinance to protect public safety45
and to discourage others from loitering with gang members.46
Whenever a person loiters with a known criminal street gang member,
their life becomes in danger.47 It does not matter whether the person
is the gang member's father, mother, social worker, or friend.48 Drive
by shootings that target gang members often take the life of innocent
by-standers. 49  One of the City Council's goals in drafting this
(1) "Pattern of criminal gang activity" means two or more
acts of criminal gang activity of which at least two such acts
were committed within five years of each other and at least
one such act occurred after the effective date of this
Section.
(2) "Public place" means the public way and other location
open to the public whether publicly or privately owned.
(d) Any person who violates this Section is subject to a
fine of not less than $100 and not more than $500 for each
offense, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or
both.
In addition to or instead of the above penalties, any person
who violates this Section may be required to perform up to
120 hours of community service pursuant to Section 1-4-
120 of this Code. Id.
,4 See Brief by the Los Angeles County District Attorney on Behalf of Los
Angeles County, supra note 29, at 14.
45 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (preamble to the Ordinance).
46 See Brief by the Los Angeles County District Attorney on Behalf of Los
Angeles County, supra note 29, at 14. The City Council saw a need for aggressive action
to preserve the city's streets and public places for the safer use of the public. Id.
47 Id. at 15-16. The Ordinance protects public safety. Id. Whenever a person
loiters with a criminal street gang member, that person could get caught in the middle of a
gang related shooting. Id.
48 Id. at 16; see, e.g., People v. Magana, 17 Cal.App. 4th 1371, 1374 (1993)
(citing the facts of the case in which gang members retaliated after a gang member's
seven-year-old son was shot).
49 See Brief by the Los Angeles County District Attorney on Behalf of Los
Angeles County, supra note 29, at 16.
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ordinance was to address this problem and, hopefully, save innocent
lives.50
This ordinance was also crafted to empower communities by
enforcing the "law abiding norms." 51 A gang deterrence theory was
implemented in this anti-loitering ordinance. 52  In accordance, the
Police Department drafted General Order 92-4, which created strict
guidelines for the enforcement of the ordinance. 53  Between 1993,
when the ordinance went into effect, and 1995, when the Court
declared it unconstitutional, police issued more than eighty-nine
thousand dispersal orders54 and arrested forty-three thousand people. 55
Jesus Morales was among those whom the police arrested.
The police identified him as a gang member because he was wearing
blue and black clothes, which are traditional colors of the Gangster's
Disciples Gang.56 This is one of the largest gangs in Chicago.57 Mr.
Morales served one day in jail after being arrested in June of 1993.58
50 id.
51 See Brief of the Center for the Community Interest, supra note 6, at 5
(explaining that social order empowers community members to reinforce law abiding
norms).
52 Id. Anti-loitering ordinances are thought to be an efficient way of raising
the price of crime. Id.
53 See Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 38, at 7.
54 See Bruce Fein, High Court, Low Learning, WASH. TIMES, June 15, 1999,
at A19; see also Craig Aaron, Menaces to Society, IN THESE TIMES, Dec. 13, 1998, at 8.
55 See Aaron, supra note 54.
56 See Kenneth Jost, High Court Justices Gang Up On Loitering Law,
RECORDER, Dec. 10, 1998, at 1.
57 See G. David Curry and Scott H. Decker, What's In a Name?: A Gang By
any Other Name Isn't Quite the Same, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 501, 508 (Spring 1997).
58 See Jost, supra note 56.
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II. HISTORY OF THE CASE
During the three years the Ordinance was in effect, two trial
judges declared it constitutional while eleven others held it
unconstitutional. 59 The court in Chicago v. Youkhana held that the
ordinance failed to notify individuals what conduct was prohibited,
and encouraged arbitrary and capricious enforcement by police. 60 the
trial court's ruling was affirmed by the Illinois Appellate Court.61
Other pending appeals were consolidated and decided in accordance
with Youkhana.62 Therefore, the conviction of Mr. Morales, amongst
others, was reversed.63
The Appellate Court held that the ordinance was
unconstitutional because it violated the right to freedom of
assembly, 64 which is guaranteed under both the First Amendment of
the Federal Constitution and Article I of the Illinois Constitution.65
The Appellate Court also held that the ordinance was vague, and thus,
violated rights under the Fourth Amendment. This court also held that
the ordinance unconstitutionally criminalized a person's status rather
than their conduct.
66
The case reached the Illinois Supreme Court on October 17,
1997,67 which ruled that the ordinance was unconstitutional because it
violated due process of law in that it was impermissibly vague on its
face and was an arbitrary restriction on personal liberties. 68  The
Illinois Supreme Court reasoned that the definition of "loitering," in
the ordinance, did not distinguish between criminal and innocent
59 Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1855.
60 See Chicago v. Youkhana, 660 N.E.2d 34 (111. App. 1 Dist. 1995).
61 id
62 id.
63 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 177 111. 2d 440, 444 (1997).
64 See Youkhana, 660 N.E. 2d at 34.
65 id.
66 id.
67 Morales, 177 111. 2d at 443.
68 See id. at 447. The Court stated that a criminal statute must meet two basic
criteria to satisfy the vagueness doctrine. Id. The statute must be definite enough to give
the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to distinguish between lawful
and unlawful conduct, and it must adequately define the criminal offense so that it does
not encourage arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement. Id.
380
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conduct. 69  "Moreover, the definition of 'loiter' did not clearly
articulate the proscription of the ordinance., 70  However, this court
did not hold that the ordinance created a "status offense," permitted
"arrests with out probable cause," or that it was "over broad.",71
Furthermore, the court acknowledged the fact that the police dispersal
order was enough to establish notice to the person loitering.
72
Nevertheless, the court held that the ordinance was "not reasonably
susceptible to a limiting construction which would affirm its
validity."
73
The Supreme Court of the United States granted certiorari on
April 20, 1998.74 After heated oral arguments, the majority affirmed
the Illinois Supreme Court's decision that the ordinance was
unconstitutionally vague because it did not give notice of the
prohibited conduct, and it failed to establish minimal guidelines for
enforcement. 75  The Court further held that loitering is a protected
right under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
76
Chief Justice Rehnquist, Justice Scalia and Justice Thomas all
dissented.77 The dissenters concluded that the ordinance was neither
vague nor violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Instead, they opined that the Illinois courts should look
at the constitutionality of the ordinance on a case by case basis.78
69 Id. at 451.
70 Id. The Court's concern was that people with entirely "legitimate and
lawful purposes will not always be able to make their purpose apparent" to police
officers. Id.
71 Id. This court's decision did not go as far as the intermediate level court.
72 See Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 568 (1965) (upholding a statute
prohibiting demonstrations near a courthouse because demonstrators could rely on the
police to tell them "how near the courthouse a particular demonstration can be.").
73 See Morales, 177 I11. 2d at 458.
74 See Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 38, at 8.
75 See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1862-63.
76 1d. at 1857.
77 1d. at 1853.
78 Id. at 1868 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that Marbury v. Madison only
gave the Court power to declare legislation unconstitutional as it applied to the particular
party and the circumstances of the particular case).
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III. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS
I have never had the terror that I feel everyday when I
walk down the streets of Chicago ..... I have had my
windows broken out. I have had guns pulled on me. I
have been threatened. I get intimidated on a daily
basis, and it's come to the point where I say, well, do I
go out today. Do I put my ax in my briefcase. Do I
walk around dressed like a bum so I am not looking
rich or got any money or anything like that.79
Until now, the Supreme Court has limited the protection of
substantive due process to matters so rooted in the traditions and
conscience of the people so as to be ranked as fundamental. 80  For
example, the court has traditionally limited the use of substantive due
process to "matters relating to marriage, family, procreation, and the
right to bodily integrity."8'
The Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Chicago anti-
loitering ordinance violated substantive due process of the Fourteenth
Amendment in that it was arbitrary in nature and infringed on
people's freedom of movement. 82  The Supreme Court affirmed,
stating that the ordinance was vague and that loitering was a
fundamental right.
83
79 Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Transcript,
124-25).
80 See Brief of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities,
National Association of Counties, National Governors' Association, Council of State
Governments, International City/County Management Association, and International
Municipal Lawyers Association at 10, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999)
(No. 97-1121).
81 Id.
82 See Morales, 177 Ill. 2d 440.
83 Id
382
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A. Fundamental Right to Loiter
Throughout American history, the right to loiter has been
subjected to limitations.84 Today, laws still exist that limit people's
right to loiter.85  The lower courts of this country have started to
declare such laws unconstitutional, relying on dictum in Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville.16 The lower court's recent rejection of anti-
loitering laws, however, is not based on fundamental rights "deeply
rooted in this Nation's history." 87 The Supreme Court confuses the
right to loiter and the right to move from one place to the next, and
instead places them into one category. For citizens to move freely
from one state to the next is a fundamental right.89  Any law
prohibiting such movement is unconstitutional.9" However, laws
against loitering are not designed to limit citizens' right to such
migration. 91 Although the Supreme Court has recognized people's
right to move freely from state to state, it has never recognized the
right to loiter in one place.
92
In fact, vagrancy and loitering laws have been part of the
Anglo-American history.93 Vagrancy laws have existed in England
and in America for over six hundred years. 94 The first loitering law
84 See Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 38, at 14. Since
at least the 14 th Century, antiloitering statutes have been a part of Anglo-American law.
Id. at 12.
85 Id. at 14.
86 Id.; see also, Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156.
87 See Washington v. Glucksburge, 117 S. Ct. 2258, 2268 (1997). The Court
held that loitering is not a fundamental right "deeply rooted in this Nation's history" since
it has been subject to significant abridgement throughout American history. Id.
88 See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1857-58. The majority states that the "right to
remove from one place to another according to inclination" is a personal liberty protected
by the Constitution. Id.
89 See Edward v. California, 314 U.S. 160, 179 (1941) (Douglas, J.
concurring) (stating that the right to move freely from state to state was a right of
"national citizenship").
90 Id.
91 See Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 38, at 17.
92 Id.
9' Id at 12.
9' Id. at 8.
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went into effect during feudal England in 1349.95 After the feudal
system fell, vagrancy laws survived.9 6 These laws evolved to prevent
crime, and crime prevention became their primary function as time
went on.97 When the English started to populate America, they
brought anti-loitering and vagrancy laws with them.98 People saw the
need to enact vagrancy and loitering laws as more and more people
settled in Colonial America.99  These laws survived even after
America freed herself of English rule. l00 The American statutes
resembled the English statutes in that their primary purpose was to
prevent crime.101 These statutes evolved to criminalize "begging,
loitering, public drunkenness, gambling, prostitution, and narcotics
trafficking."' 1
0 2
These laws remained constitutional for most of America's
history. 103 The first case to challenge the constitutionality of vagrancy
laws was Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, in 1972.104 This case
challenged the constitutionality of the vagrancy laws in Jacksonville,
Florida. 10 5 Five cases were consolidated into one, and the charges
95 See Joel D. Berg, The Troubled Constitutionality of Antigang Loitering
Laws, 69 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 461, 462 (explaining that this was motivated by economic
reasons). 96 Id. at 463. They survived as a means of preventing crime. Id.
97 Id. Unemployed wanderers supported themselves through crime, and the
vagrancy and loitering laws evolved to stop such crime. Thus, people were no longer
being punished for their status, such as being poor or unemployed, but rather because of
their criminal acts. Id.
98 Id.
99 See Berg, supra note 95, at 463-4.
1'o Id. at 463.
1O1 Id. at 463-4.
o2tld. at 464.
103 Id.
104 See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156 (1972). This case
did not strike down loitering and vagrancy statutes per se, rather the decision only placed
a clarity requirement on the drafting of these statutes. Id.
105 The Jacksonville ordinance read as follows:
Rogues and Vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about
begging, common gamblers, persons who use juggling or
unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common
night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in
stolen property, lewd, wanton and lascivious persons,
keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
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included "prowling by auto, loitering, disorderly loitering, being a
common thief, and being a vagabond."' 106  The Court declared the
ordinance unconstitutional for vagueness, as there was a lack of notice
of the prohibited conduct.'0 7  Additionally, the court opined that it
gave police too much discretionary power in administering the law. 108
The Court stated that Jacksonville's ordinance and Florida's Statute
were derived from early English law, and employed archaic language
in its definition of vagrants.1
0 9
Unlike the Jacksonville ordinance, the Chicago ordinance
addressed a "current and serious problem." '" 0 The Chicago ordinance
dealt with a "distinctly modem problem with a fresh set of legislative
facts to support it.""' Chicago's innovative statute was an attempt by
the city to stop tolerating the smallest level of pubic disorder in order
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place
without any lawful purpose or object, habitual loafers,
disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business
and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of
ill fame, gambling houses, or places where alcoholic
beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but
habitually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor
children shall be deemed vagrants and, upon conviction in
the Municipal Court shall be punished as provided for Class
D offenses. Id. at 156-57 n. l(quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA.,
ORDINANCE CODE § 26-5 7 (1965)).
106 Id. at 158; see also, Berg, supra note 95, at 464-5.
107 See Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162 (stating that a statute is void for
vagueness if a statute fails to give a person of ordinary intelligence fair notice of the
prohibited conduct).
'°' Id. at 170-171.
'
09 Id. at 156.
110 Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner at 9, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct.
1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121).
"11 Id. at 8. This law represents the culmination of thorough study and
consideration, and it takes on the youth gang crime by regulating gang loitering in urban
areas. Id.
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to stop breeding further disorder.11 2 The theory was that "disorder
breeds more disorder." '11
3
The Chicago City Council wanted a solution to this breeding
of disorder. The Papachristou decision was by no means a per se rule
against all anti-loitering and vagrancy laws.1 14 The Court in that case
only desired clarity in drafting such statutes. 1 5 After the ruling in
Papachristou, new statutes that complied with the ruling were quickly
drafted. 116 This showed that such statutes were deemed an important
part of community policing. Still, today, vagrancy and loitering laws
are used to prevent crime such as drug trafficking and prostitution.1 1
7
The Chicago anti-loitering ordinance was drafted with the same spirit
as previous statutes. Its primary purpose was to prevent criminal gang
activities, which terrorize Chicago's neighborhoods.
The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
focuses on procedural fairness. 1 8  Drafters of the Fourteenth
Amendment believed that some rights were so fundamental that the
people should not be deprived of them. 19 The Supreme Court has
applied substantive due process to only those areas that are
"objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."'' 20
Although the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause does
protect a person's right to travel freely between states, it does not
112 See Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life in Public
Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 555 (1997).
"' Id. at 581.
114 See Berg, supra note 95, at 465.
115 Id.
116 1d
"
117 id
118 See Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 38, at 9 ("[A]
fair process must be employed before out government may deprive anyone of life, liberty,
or property.")
119 See id.; see, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (explaining that
the right to direct the education and upbringing of one's children is a fundamental right
that the government may not deprive the citizens of).
120 Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 38, at 10. The
Substantive component of the Due Process Clause has been invoked by the Court to make
sure that citizens are not deprived of certain liberty interests that are thought to be
fundamental. Id.
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protect that person's right to loiter.12 1 The Supreme Court has never
used substantive Due Process to strike down the crime prevention
aspect of vagrancy laws. 1
22
B. Rational Basis Review
Even though the Court held that the Chicago anti-loitering
ordinance does affect a liberty interest, the Court still should have
held the ordinance constitutional. 23  As long as the ordinance
implicated a "constitutionally protected liberty interest, but
impinge[d] on no fundamental right" the Court should have held it
constitutional because it is "rationally related to a legitimate
government interest."'
' 24
The Chicago Ordinance was of "substantial governmental
interest" in "attempting to preserve the quality of urban life.' ' 125 The
fact finding by the City Council showed the necessity to control gangs
in order to enforce public safety.' 26  This innovative gang anti-
loitering ordinance tried to deal with a real problem that exists in the
"2 See id at 16; see, e.g, Edward v. California, 314 U.S. at 176-77 (1941)
(discussing the right to move freely from state to state).
122 See Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 38, at 17
(stating that the purpose of the Ordinance is not to restrict the movement of citizens, the
purpose is to prevent people to remain in one place without a purpose).
123 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 26, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119
S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121) (explaining that loitering is not a fundamental right and
the ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose).
124 Id.; see also Glucksburge, 521 U.S. at 2271-72.
125 Brief of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities,
National Association of Counties, National Governors' Association, Council of State
Governments, International City/County Management Association, and International
Municipal Lawyers Association, supra note 80, at 15 (quoting Renton v. Playtime
Theaters, Inc., 475 U.S. 41, 50-51 (1986)).
126 See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 7.
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City of Chicago.' 27 This ordinance was drafted after much research
and a hearing where the citizens of the city talked of their unlivable
neighborhoods. 128  The city had a rational basis for drafting and
ratifying such ordinance. 129 By trying to fight gang loitering, the city
was trying to end the "spiral" of further disorder and violence. 1
30
The Supreme Court cites Papachristou for the proposition that
loitering is a fundamental right.'13  However, there are very few
similarities between the ordinance in Papachristou and Chicago's
ordinance. 132  As stated before, Chicago's ordinance was an
innovative attempt to end loitering of gang members on city
corners.133 "The Chicago ordinance served legitimate ends and did so
through legitimate means."' 34 In contrast, the Court in Papachristou
recognized that the law was "archaic,"' 35 "no longer fit the facts,"'
' 36
and was too generalized.
137
Historically, the right to travel between states and reside in a
state has not been thought to extend to loitering. 138  "Loitering is an
127 See id. at 8. Three specific harms form the basis of this ordinance:
Intimidation of residents, facilitation of crime, and victimization of young people through
gang shootings. Id.
128 Id. at 8-9.
129 Id. at 9. The City of Chicago took into consideration both public policy
and results from the two day hearing before the City Council. Id.
130 Id.; see also Livingston, supra note 112, at 581-82 (stating that by refusing
to tolerate mild levels of disorder, cities can avoid spirals into more severe disorder and
crime).
131See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 9-10.
132 See id. at 10. The law in Papachristou was old and outdated, but the
Chicago law was aimed at a modem problem and addresses new and different conditions.
Id.
... Id. at 8.
134 Id. at 10.
135 Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 156.
131 Id. at 162.
13 7 Id. at 171.
138 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 123, at 27.
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amenity of life.' '139 However, laws often limit such amenities when
"liberty interests" become conflicting.
40
IV. BALANCING
We used to have a nice neighborhood. We don't have
it anymore. ... I am scared to go out in the daytime
.... You can't pass because they are standing. I am
afraid to go to the store. I don't go to the store
because I am afraid. At my age if they look at me real
hard, I be ready to holler. 141
The Supreme Court has described "special needs" which
require something other than routine law enforcement.142 The Court
has previously stated that, "recent research suggests that more
intensive supervision can reduce recidivism."'143  Such supervision
was identified by the Court as a "special need," which would require
an alternative method of policing that might have a "degree of
impingement upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied
to the public at large."'144 Chicago has a "special need" to supervise
loitering criminal street gang members.' 45 The "special need" is to
clear the streets of gang members so as to create safety for all citizens,
including the gang members, and to also create law-abiding norms
within the neighborhoods. 46
139 Id.
M4 id.
141 Morales 119 S. Ct. at 1880 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Transcript at
66-67).
142 See Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873-74 (1987) (noting that there
may be "'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures from
the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.")
143 Id. at 875.
"14 Id. at 875.
145 See Brief by the Los Angeles County District Attorney on Behalf of Los
Angeles County, supra note 29, at 16 (stating that the special need here is to protect not
only gang members but also innocent bystanders from violence).
146 Id. This will lead the law-abiding citizens to take their neighborhoods
back from criminal gang activities. Id.
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The ordinance did not impinge on any rights mentioned in the
Constitution or the Bill of Rights. 147 A search, seizure, or even an
arrest was not required.1 48 The ordinance simply required loiterers to
disperse when an officer issued a dispersal order. 149 Chicago did not
intrude on any protected rights. 50 Even if they did, any minimal
intrusion was not substantial enough to outweigh the State interest in
drafting the ordinance.' 51 Chicago did have an interest in preventing
violence on its streets.' 52 The ordinance was a balance between harsh
criminal penalties and inaction,' 53 deterred "as well as or better than
severe prison terms," and it cost much less.' 54 The measure worked
effectively, "without the need to resort to severe penalties for gang
related crime, a tactic that is costly for society, has a dismal track
record, and destroys communities from which gang members
come."
155
Normal policing strategies have proven ineffective in
neighborhoods where gangs are dominant.' 56  Youths in such
neighborhoods are more likely to turn to a life of crime.' 57  By
preventing gangs from loitering and enforcing police authority over
these neighborhoods, the citizens can take charge of their
communities and diminish "the perception that gangs have high
status."' 158 As the law abiding norms are established young people
will not be pressured into joining gangs, thus, reducing gang
147 Id. The Ordinance does not require police to search or arrest, but only to
order dispersal and removal of loiterers. Id. Any rights implicated by the Ordinance are
not ones mentioned in the Constitution or the Bill of Rights. Id.
1481 d.at 16-17.
149 id.
150 See Brief by the Los Angeles County District Attorney on Behalf of Los
Angeles County, supra note 29, at 16-17.
' Id. at 17.
152 Id.
153 See Dan M. Kahan, Between Economics And Sociology: The New Path of
Deterrence, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2477, 2479 (1997) (arguing that loitering ordinances
represent a middle ground solution).
154 id.
155 Id. at 2489.
156 See Brief of the Center for the Community Interest, supra note 6, at 25.
157 Id. (stating that aggressive behavior is more prevalent where gang activity
exists, and when youths act aggressively, they are more likely to turn to crime).
158 Id. at 25-26.
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membership. 159 As a result, gangs' hold on the neighborhoods will
weaken. 160 Also, law-abiding citizens will gain confidence that they
can oppose gangs in their community. 161 When the community
becomes strong and comes together to show their disapproval of gang
activity, gang domination over those neighborhoods will weaken.
162
When determining whether a policy strikes a reasonable
balance, the courts usually look at how the policy has impacted the
community.163  If the policy is set up to bully the "powerless
minority," then any benefits to the community do not outweigh the
infringement on liberty.1 64 The Chicago Ordinance was not designed
to target powerless minority groups. The Ordinance was designed to
cure Chicago of gang violence and intimidation, which infects its
communities. The community benefits definitely outweigh any
arguable infringement on personal liberty.
V. VOID-FOR-VAGUENESS DOCTRINE
I fought in the Vietnam War. I was a fireman. I was
an auxiliary policeman. I have never had the terror
that I feel everyday when I walk down the streets of
Chicago... When I call the police, the police come to
my house and it points me out. I have had my
windows broken out. I have had guns pulled on me. I
have been threatened
5 9 Id. at 26.
160 Id.
161 See Brief of the Center for the Community Interest, supra note 6, at 26.
162 id.
163 See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Chicago Neighborhood Organization in
Support of the Petitioner, supra note 21, at 6.1641id.
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I get intimidated on a daily basis, and it's come to the
point where I say, 'Well, do Igo out today?"
65
Statutes can be void for vagueness under the Due Process
Clause if they fail to provide "fair warning" of the prohibited conduct,
or if they fail to "provide explicit standards" limiting police discretion
in enforcing them.166  The Chicago ordinance met both of the due
process requirements.167 The ordinance authorized the police to issue
dispersal orders to people loitering if one or more was a known street
gang member. 168  Aside from the language of the ordinance, the
dispersal order itself gave additional notice that the conduct was
prohibited. 69  The police could not punish people for loitering but
could only punish people who disobeyed the dispersal order. 170 The
ordinance provided sufficient notice and limited police discretion in
the enforcement of the ordinance.
A. Notice
Due Process requires that "laws give the person of ordinary
intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know what is prohibited, so
that he may act accordingly."' 7 To satisfy Due Process, the Court has
165 Brief of the Washington Legal Foundation, supra note 38, at 5 (citing a
resident of the City of Chicago who offered his story at the City Council hearing).
166 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-9 (1972).
167 See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 14. The Ordinance (1)
authorizes police to issue dispersal orders when they reasonably believe that one or more
loiterers is a gang member; (2) gives the additional notice to people when they are told to
disperse; and (3) punishes only those who disobey the police dispersal order. Id These
provisions bring the Ordinance well within the requirements of due process. Id.168 id.
169 Id. at 14-15 (explaining that citizens, even if claiming ignorance of the
law, will know that their conduct is prohibited because of the police dispersal order).170 id.
171 Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S.
489, 498 (1982) (quoting Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-9 (1972)).
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also required that a statute "provide fair warning" of the prohibited
conduct. 72  The Chicago ordinance satisfied these requirements.1 73
The dissent stated that "if any fool would know that a particular
category of conduct would be within the reach of the statute, if there is
an unmistakable core that a reasonable person would know is
forbidden by the law, the enactment is not unconstitutional on its
face." 174 It is expected that people of "ordinary intelligence" would
understand the meaning of the term "loiter."'
' 75
"Under this ordinance, the order to disperse gives notice in the
same way that 'no parking' signs give the public notice of where
parking is forbidden .. .. 176 The Supreme Court has laid out the law
on what is acceptable notice under the Due Process Clause. People
cannot be held criminally liable for conduct, that they did not
reasonably know was prohibited by law. 177 Basically, Due Process
requires "fair warning that certain kinds of conduct are prohibited."' 78
The Chicago ordinance met the standards for clarity. 179  The
ordinance clearly defined each term such as "loiter" and "criminal
street gang."'' 80 The definitions of the terms in the ordinance are not
vague. The definition for "gang loitering" was sufficient to allow a
172 Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972). To satisfy due
process requirements, the ordinance must "provide fair warning" of the prohibited
conduct and provide "explicit standards to limit the discretion of police in enforcing it.
Id.
173 See Brief for the Petitioner at 29, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct.
1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121).
174 See Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1886 (quoting Kolander v. Lawson, 461 U.S.
352, 370-71 (1983) (White, J., Dissenting)).
175 id.
176 Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 123, at 15.
177 See, e.g., United States v. Lanier, 117 S. Ct. 1219, 1225 (1997) (stating
that due process requires that no one "'shall be held criminally responsible for conduct
which he could not reasonably understand to be proscribed"').
178 Colten v. Kentucky, 407 U.S. 104, 110 (1972) (stating that due process
requires "fair warning" that certain conducts are prohibited).
179 See Brief of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities,
National Association of Counties, National Governors' Association, Council of State
Governments, International City/County Management Association, and International
Municipal Lawyers Association, supra note 80, at 19.
181 See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015, supra note 32 (definitional
section).
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reasonable person to know what conduct was prohibited.' 8' A person
may not "remain in one place" with no "apparent purpose" with a
member of a "criminal street gang., 18 2 To "remain in one place" is an
objective concept. 183  A police officer can observe that a group of
people is remaining in one place.' 84 "Apparent purpose" is not vague
either. When a reasonable person observing the group of people
cannot determine a reason why the group is there, then the group
could have no apparent purpose. 185 Also, the ordinance clearly set
forth the prohibited conduct which was "remaining in one place with
no apparent purpose" in the presence of a one or more members of a
"criminal street gang."' 86 A person of common intelligence should
not have a hard time understanding this ordinance, or what conduct
was prohibited.187
Even if there remained any doubt, such as the citizen who did
not realize they were in the presence of a "criminal street gang"
member, or the person claimed ignorance to the law, the police would
let them know that the conduct was prohibited by issuing a dispersal
181 See Brief of Amici Curiae National District Attorneys Association and
International Associations of Chief of Police in Support of the Petitioner City of Chicago
at 16, City of Chicago v. Morales, 119 S. Ct. 1849 (1999) (No. 97-1121) (NDAA is the
sole organization representing local prosecuting attorneys across the United States. The
IACP is the largest organization of police executives and line officers in the world,
consisting of more than 16,000 members in 96 nations).
182 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015.
183 See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 16 (explaining that the
police have always been able to investigate, seek out, and stop crime based on their
reasonable suspicion or on the probable cause standard).
184 Id.
185 Id.
186 CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015.
187 Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California,
Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, Nevada,
New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 14.
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order.' 1 The Chicago ordinance did not make loitering, in itself, a
crime; however, loitering coupled with a disregard for a police
dispersal order became a crime.
Furthermore, since loitering by itself was not illegal in
Chicago, no notice is required under the Due Process Clause.'89 The
police dispersal order provided notice to citizens of the prohibited
conduct. 190 The Court has upheld statutes that use police orders as
notice. 191 As long as a reasonable person could understand what the
police order required him or her to do, sufficient notice was present.1
92
The police could only punish people if there was a failure to obey the
dispersal order.' 93 A reasonable person, in this circumstance, should
have understood the possibility of conviction for the failure to obey an
order to move on.' 94
The ordinance had no element of surprise.195 The ordinance
gave citizens notice that if they chose to loiter with a gang member,
188 See id. Even if the citizen did not realize that their conduct was
prohibited, the police dispersal order provides the prerequisite notice required under due
process. Id.
189 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 123, at 16 (stating that no
notice is required because loitering by itself is not a crime in Chicago. It becomes a crime
when it is coupled with a police dispersal order).
190 See id. Via the dispersal order, the police provide citizens with notice that
they should be moving along. Id.
191 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312 (explaining that an order to
"disperse and remove yourself from the area" uses "words of common understanding"
therefore providing fair notice.); see also Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965) ("[A]
refusal to move after being ordered to do so," is "narrow and specific.")
192 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 123, 19-20.
193 See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 14-15. The police cannot
punish people prior to issuing the dispersal order therefore limiting their discretion in
arresting people. Id.
194 See Colten, 407 U.S. at 110.
195 See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
N.Y.L. ScH. J. HUM. RTs. [Vol. XVII
they would be subject to a police dispersal order. 196  However, in
those instances where the person may not realize that they are
"loitering," or that they are in the presence of one or more "criminal
street gang" members, the ordinance provided the citizens notice via a
dispersal order. 197 The dispersal order was an additional method to
give citizens notice that their conduct was prohibited. 198 The dispersal
order alone satisfied the due process requirement of notice.1 99 No one
could be punished unless they disobeyed the dispersal order.2 °°
Citizens are not deprived of their Constitutional rights when they are
given notice and simply told to move on.
20 1
Until now, the Court has not held a statute vague due to "lack
of notice" when an officer reasonably believed that a public-safety
risk existed.20 2 Under the Fourth Amendment, the police have had the
authority to stop, seize material, or question individuals. 20 3 They have
been able to use the "reasonable suspicion" standard to stop crime.20 4
The Chicago ordinance gave the police authority, under this
"reasonable suspicion" standard, to disperse groups of people loitering
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 14.
'9' id. at 14-15.
197 id.
'
98 Id. at 15-16.
199 Id.
200 See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015.
201 See Brief of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities,
National Association of Counties, National Governors' Association, Council of State
Governments, International City/County Management Association, and International
Municipal Lawyers Association, supra note 80, at 24.
202 See, e.g., Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 331-32 (1988) (rejecting vagueness
challenges to ordinance limiting demonstrations at embassies because it was interpreted to
permit dispersal "only when the police reasonably believe that a threat to the security or
peace of the embassy is present"); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114 ( citing that an ordinance
prohibiting noisy interference with school activity "requires the exercise of some degree
of police judgement, but, as confined, that degree of judgement here is permissible");
Colten, 407 U.S. at 109 (upholding conviction of a refusal to obey dispersal order where
"police had cause for apprehension... [of] the risk of accident").
203 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1968). Uunder the Fourth
Amendment police officers can use the standards of "reasonable suspicion" and "probable
cause" as objective methods for determining when they can interfere with a person's
liberty. Id.
204 id.
396
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on the street whom the police had a "reasonable suspicion" contained
one or more "criminal street gang" members.2 °5
In addition, an order to disperse did not have to contain
"precise geographical guidance." 20 6 A person could choose to leave
an area where the police issued the order.207 A police order provided
adequate notice that the people in the group were "loitering" with one
or more gang members and that they should move on.208 The Court
has stated, in dictum, that an anti-loitering statute was not void for
vagueness where it provided for detainment of those who obstructed
the free passage of streets or sidewalks and refused to obey a police
order to move. 209 The City Counsel simply wanted the loitering
groups to disperse and move on.
B. Police Discretion
Due Process also requires that "laws must provide explicit
standards for those who apply them. 2 °10  This requires that "a
legislature establish minimal guidelines to govern law
enforcement." 2" It is to ensure that law enforcement authorities do
not conduct a "standardless sweep" allowing "policemen, prosecutors,
and juries to personal predilections. 212 Therefore, statutes that allow
for a subjective standard of enforcement should be held
unconstitutional.2 |3 However, laws that "set forth objective criteria"
should be held constitutional under the same analysis.21 4 The Chicago
205 Id. at 21-22 (citing the reasonableness standard: "would the facts available
to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the search warrant a man of reasonable
caution in the belief that the action taken was appropriate.")
206 See Colten, 407 U.S. 104. The police order to move on was upheld even
though it did not contain a precise geographical guidance as to how far the person should
move. Id.; see, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 551 (1965).
207 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 123, at 19.
201 Id. at 20-21.
209 See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965). The
Court struck down an ordinance which provided that "a person may stand on a public
sidewalk in Birmingham only at the whim of any police officer of that city." id.
210 Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
211 Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 574 (1974).
212 Id. at 575.
213 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 173, at 33.
214 id.
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anti-loitering ordinance set objective criteria for enforcement, and
thus, should have been held constitutional.215
The ordinance could only be applied to a group of people who
were "loitering" in the presence of one or more "criminal street gang
members." 216 Also, the police officer must have reasonably believe
that one or more of the people "loitering" was a gang member.217 If
the "reasonable suspicion" 21 8 standard gives the police the limited
power to stop loiterers and question them, then an officer having a
reasonable suspicion that a group contained gang members should
have an equally limited power to order the group's dispersion.21 9
As an additional measure, the City of Chicago Police
Department drafted General Order 92-4. This order interpreted the
ordinance to require probable cause in believing that a group of
loiterers contained one or more gang members.220 The probable cause
standard that the police department required was higher than the
reasonable suspicion standard required by the ordinance. The Police
Department also set a "rigorous standard" for identifying gang
members. 221  These administrative standards should have been
considered in the Court's analysis of vagueness. 222  The Supreme
215 Id. The Ordinance sets forth the following objective standards: it does not
allow officers to issue dispersal orders to anyone who is moving along or who has an
apparent purpose; it does not allow officers to arrest anyone who follows the dispersal
order issued; and it applies the reasonableness standard of the Terry test. Id.
216 See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 123, at 22-23.
217 See id. The ordinance does not give the police discretion to enforce it
against people who are moving along, obeying the dispersal order, or having an apparent
purpose. Id.
218 Terry, 392 U.S. 1.
219 See Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 173, at 35 (explaining that the
Terry test is an objective test: if this standard allows officers the limited power to detain
loiterers, then an officer having a reasonable suspicion that a loiterer as a member of a
criminal street gang has the equal limited power to order them to move on).
220 See id. General order 92-4 interprets the ordinance "to require probable
cause to believe that a loiterer is a member of a criminal street gang." Id. It also states
rigid tests of determining membership in a criminal street gang. Id.
221 Id. at 35-36 (stating that this order considers a variety of objective indicia
of membership in a criminal street gang, such as an individuals admission, display of
gang's distinctive signs or symbols, or the existence of information from a reliable
informant).
222 Id. Had the majority considered these administrative standards, then they
might not have held the ordinance void for vagueness. Id
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Court has often taken into consideration administrative standards in
determining whether a state statute was constitutional.223
The police department only allowed tactical unit officers and
gang-crime police officers to enforce the ordinance.224 These officers
were educated on how to enforce the ordinance without violating the
constitutional rights of the Chicago's citizens. 225  The Police
Department compiled a repository on specific gangs.226 This helped
officers identify gang members in order to effectively enforce the
ordinance, and provide proof to back them up in the courts.227
General Order 92-4 was designed, by the police department, to avoid
arbitrary enforcement of the ordinance. 228  In addition to the Order,
the police department designated certain areas, which were infected
with gang violence, as the only areas where the ordinance could be
enforced.229
223 See, e.g., Village of Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates,
Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 494 n.5 (1982) ("In evaluating a facial challenge to a state law, a
federal court must, of course, consider any limiting construction that a state court or
enforcement agency has proffered."); see also Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S.
781, 795 (1989) ("Even if the language of the guideline were not sufficient on its face to
withstand challenge, the city has interpreted the guideline in such a manner as to provide
additional guidance to the officials charged with its enforcement.")
224 See Robert Davis, Special Units to Police Loiterers: City Wants to Make
New Anti-Gang Law Hold Up in Court, CHI. TRIB., June 19, 1992, at C3 (explaining that
General Order 92-4 provided that only specially trained and designated officers familiar
with gang crime can make gang loitering arrests to safeguard against the law being used
indiscriminately).
225 See id. The designated officers studied how to make maximum use of the
Ordinance without violating citizen's constitutional rights. Id.
226 Id. The police was to compile an extensive file of known gang members.
Id.
227 id.
228 See Brief of the U.S. Conference of Mayors, National League of Cities,
National Association of Counties, National Governors' Association, Council of State
Governments, International City/County Management Association, and International
Municipal Lawyers Association, supra note 80, at 25.
229 See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 22 (stating that these are
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court has crafted guidelines as to
when broad police powers are reserved to the States. 230 The Court has
reserved police power to the States when "family values, youth
values, and the blessings of quiet seclusion and clean air" are the
goals in organizing "local communities and establishing local rules of
conduct."23  The Chicago ordinance met these guidelines.232  The
ordinance was designed to rid the streets of Chicago of criminal gang
activity and intimidation so as to make neighborhoods a safer place
for residents.233
It is "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition" that
the principal duty of the police in society is to "maintain public
peace., 234 Police officers are not just "enforcers of the criminal law,"
but they also have the duty to preserve public peace. 235 Traditionally,
police have had the authority to disperse groups of people who
threaten public peace. 236  The ABA standards for Criminal Justice
recognizes that "'[i]n day-to-day police experience there are
areas in which the presence of gang members has had a demonstrable effect on the
activities of law-abiding citizens in the surrounding community).230 See id. at 21-22.
231 Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 9 (1974) (stating that
"historic police power problems need not loom large or actually be existent in a given
case" for a-law to be valid because "laws may also find their justification in the fact that,
in some, fields, the bad fades into good by ... insensible degrees").
232 See Brief of Amicus Curiae of Ohio, Alabama, Alaska, Arizona,
California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas,
Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska,
Nevada, New York, North Carolina, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah,
Commonwealth of Kentucky, Pennsylvania, Puerto Rico and Virginia and Territory of
Virgin Islands in Support of the Petitioner, supra note 110, at 22. The ordinance is trying
to make the streets safer for citizens of Chicago from criminal street gang crime and
recruitment. Id.
233 See id.
234 Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1881 (Thomas, J., dissenting) ("The ordinance does
nothing more than confirm the well-established principal that the police have the duty and
the power to maintain public peace, and, when necessary, to disperse groups of
individuals who threaten it.")2351 d. at 1883.
236 Id. at 1884 (explaining that it is the duty of the Police Force to "preserve
public peace, prevent crime, detect and arrest offenders, suppress riots, mobs and
insurrections, disperse unlawful or dangerous assemblages, and assemblages which
obstruct the passage of public streets, sidewalks, parks and places." (quoting 1887 Police
Manual for the City of New York)).
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innumerable situations in which police are called upon to order people
not to block the sidewalk, not to congregate in a given place, and not
to loiter . . .. The police may suspect the loiterer of considering
engaging in some form of undesirable conduct that can be at least
temporarily frustrated by ordering him or her to move on.'
237
We rely on police officers to make "spur-of-the-moment
determinations" regarding vague legal concepts of "probable cause"
and "reasonable suspicion. 238 If we trust the police to make such
findings, we surely can trust them to determine whether a group of
people are "loitering" with gang members who threaten public
peace. 239 The Supreme Court has said that police officers "may draw
inferences based on their own experience., 240 Therefore, the majority
view that this ordinance is impermissibly vague because it
"necessarily entrusts lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgement
of the policeman on his beat" 241 is not in accordance with this Court's
"Fourth Amendment jurisprudence." 242
CONCLUSION
"In many of our Nation's cities, gangs have '[v]irtually
overtak[en] certain neighborhoods, contributing to the economic and
social decline of these areas and causing fear and lifestyle changes
among law-abiding residents.' 243  One can say that Chicago has
237 Id. (quoting ABA Standards for Criminal Justice 1-3.4 (d) at 1.88 and
comments (2d ed. 1980, Supp. 1986).238 Id. at 1885.
239 See Omelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 695, 700 (1996) ("Articulating
precisely what reasonable suspicion and probable cause mean is not possible. They are
common sense, non-technical conceptions that deal with the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men not legal
technicians, act .. )
240 id.
241 Morales, 119 S. Ct. at 1861 (quoting Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352,
359 (1983).
242 Id. at 1885 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
243 Morales, 119 S. Ct at 1878-80 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting U.S.
Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, Bureau of Justice Assistance).
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always been infested with gang Violence, 244 dating back to the days of
Al Capone and Frank Nitti.245 Without doubt, Elliot Ness and his
Untouchables would be ashamed and disgusted if they saw Chicago
today.246 They would be disappointed at the Supreme Court's ruling
striking the anti-loitering ordinance.
This ordinance was a new and innovative method of dealing
with gangs in Chicago. Chicago is still infested with criminal street
gangs intimidating and causing havoc on Chicago's communities.
People, especially the elderly, fear for their lives when they leave their
homes, and parents are terrified when their children go to school or
play in the yard. Most sadly of all, the Chicago City Council
members are back at the drawing board wondering what they can
come up with next to battle the gangs. The ordinance was neither
vague nor violated the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.247 Justice Thomas opined in his dissent in Morales that
"[b]y invalidating Chicago's ordinance, I fear that the Court has
unnecessarily sentenced law-abiding citizens to lives of terror and
misery.
248
Layli Eskandari
244 See Bob Greene, Even Capone Would Be Disgusted, CHI. TRIB., Oct. 10,
1999, at C2.
245 See id.
246 id.
247 See Morales, 119 S. Ct at 1879 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
248 Id.
